The contributions in this section of the issue examine some aspects of the legal system in Iran and its relationship to the principle of justice. It is important to note that legalism and the rule of law have been central to the rhetoric of legitimacy in the Islamic Republic. After the 1979 Revolution Ayatollah Khomeini denounced the secular legal system of the Pahlavis and pledged his commitment to a distinctly Islamic conception of legality on which the new order should be based. He declared the Persian New Year 1360 (1981-1982) the ‘year of the rule of law’ (sal-e hokumat-e qanun), maintaining that ‘all the Prophets since the beginning of the world have come for the establishment of the law (qanun) and Islam has come for the establishment of the law’.^[3] The declaration paved the way for the introduction in that year of a codification of the Law of Hodud^[4] and Qesas^[5] derived from Shi’a jurisprudence (fiqh) replacing the secular penal code of 1926, to which new chapters (Diyat and Ta’azirat) were later added. Steps were also taken to Islamicise the judiciary culminating in 1991 in the abolition of the procuracy (dadsara) and a reversion to the traditional sharia court model in which the functions of prosecutor, investigator and judge were combined in the person of the judge, a move which seriously compromised the independence of the judge in legal proceedings.^[6]

The current judiciary has three branches. First, the public courts in charge of criminal and civil cases. Second, revolutionary courts, whose judgements are final and cannot be appealed in any cases that in some way undermine the Islamic Republic, such as crimes against national security. Third, the special clerical courts which handle crimes committed by the clerics with judgements that are final and accountable to the Supreme Leader. Article 156 of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution enshrines the independence of the judiciary.^[7] However in practice, the Iranian judicial system lacks independence and has become a vital instrument in implementing the will of the Supreme Leader. For example, the Head of the Judiciary is appointed by the Supreme Leader who is charged with the appointment of the Head of the Supreme Court as well as the Minister of Justice. Furthermore, as several of the contributors to this review show, the legal system is characterised by extreme arbitrariness, judicial lawlessness, the enforcement, or at least selective enforcement, of brutal hodud punishments, the undermining of independent legal representation, the widespread use of torture, other egregious violations of due process, and mass prison killings in the 1980s which on any definition amount to crimes against humanity.^[8]

Pressures from Iranian civil society as well as numerous international human rights reports published mainly during the 1990s and early 2000s prompted the government to restore the procuracy and make other mild attempts at reform from the early 2000s during Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi’s tenure as head of the judiciary (2000-2009).^[9]Indeed, the establishment of the rule of law was one of the main pillars of President Mohammad Khatami’s platform in 1997.^[10]Khatami identified the legal system as one of the most dysfunctional and abusive components of the Islamic Republic, which he emphasised, was clearly violating its own constitution.^[11] Ironically, these very same institutions were instrumental in repressing the reform movement, manifested in the early 2000s, mainly in the shape of the judiciary shutting down reformist newspapers and the Guardian Council vetoing reformist bills.^[12] Consequently, the judiciary became highly politicised during the presidency of Khatami and emerged as the main guardian of the unelected institutions (or ‘deep state’) in Iran.^[13] The situation deteriorated again with the crackdown on the Green Movement and its leaders during the 2009 post-election uprising, manifested in the mass show trials which followed, the widespread use of torture and rape in the course of the suppression and deaths of young protestors in the notorious Kahrizak prison and the confiscation and imprisonment of hundreds. At the height of the protests in June 2009, new regulations were introduced that, in effect, nullified Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq’s 1955 law guaranteeing independence for the Bar Association. Although the regulations were later suspended, they were replaced by a new bill of attorneyship which, if passed, could transform the Bar Association into a branch of the judiciary removing its independence and with it one of the main due process safeguards remaining in the legal system.^[14] This bill is the latest in a series of attacks on the independence of the legal profession, beginning after the revolution and continuing through the 1980s and 1990s, which, as Matine-Daftary shows in this review, has seriously undermined the long established right of defence in the criminal courts in Iran.

Another recent development is the 2012 promulgation of a revised penal code, originally commissioned by Shahroudi in part at least in the light of growing international criticism of the provisions of the old law (highlighted in the international arena by the Sakineh Ashtiani case).^[15] The revised code has been touted by the government as an improvement on the older version and one that broadly complies with international human rights standards.^[16] In reality, it employs a great deal of sophistry and vaguely worded articles to retain and even enhance many of the negative features of the old code such as stoning for adultery, arbitrary decision-making by judges (elm-e qazi),^[17] discriminatory provisions against women and religious minorities and the criminalisation of political dissent through vaguely worded crimes such as moharebeh (warring with God) and efsad-e fel arz (sowing corruption on earth).

This cursory examination of the rule of law in Iran leads to serious concerns around access to justice as reflected in a recent global rule of law index produced by the World Justice Project in which Iran ranked 82^nd of 99 countries, a low ranking confirmed by the findings of this issue of Iran Human Rights Review.^[18]

Social justice was a central component in the ideology of the revolution of the Islamic Republic generally and the rhetoric of social justice has remained central to the discourse of successive Iranian administrations, opposition movements, as well as of the Supreme Leader.^[19] Backed by Article 29 of the Islamic Republic constitution, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have often boasted that in this area Iran is the envy of many developing countries, citing its impressive performance especially in the areas of poverty reduction and the provision of physical infrastructure to deprived areas. Critics of the Islamic Republic have questioned these claims by casting doubt on the veracity and reliability of essential data. Indeed, statistics published by various state agencies are often contradictory or lack detailed coverage.^[20] Data on the balance sheets of public enterprises as well as on the accounts of bonyads (charitable trusts set up after the revolution which control an estimated 20-40% of Iran’s GDP) are not available to the public.^[21] Therefore, observations in terms of macro-economic criteria for measuring social justice are somewhat tentative.

Since the revolution there have been several bouts of economic populism and redistribution which have had mixed results. Some scholars (including contributors to this review) have argued that levels of absolute poverty fell during the first 10 years after the Revolution and although they have fluctuated since then, poverty has generally decreased over the past 35 years.^[22]​This was most apparent in the deprived rural areas where there were notable improvements in social services such as health, education and the provision of infrastructure such as water and electricity.^[23] But whilst absolute poverty has been reduced, the Islamic Republic has fared worse in terms of reducing relative poverty (or inequality).^[24] The Gini Index of inequality in Iran has for the most part remained at the higher end for developing countries (i.e. Iran has generally been more unequal than most other middle-income and developing countries).^[25]

While there is a debate on which is more important, absolute or relative poverty, a common trend across many societies is that as absolute poverty decreases, relative poverty becomes more important as a political issue. This is particularly relevant to Iran where the legitimacy of the state has often been based more on redistribution than wealth creation.^[26]The corrosive effects of inequality are now well-documented; in brief, it tends to create social grievances and instability at the bottom and rent-seeking and corruption at the top.^[27]The reasons for the failure to tackle inequality successfully are complex and may be attributed to a number of factors. The successive waves of botched privatisation and cronyism under Rafsanjani,^[28]particularly intensified under Ahmadinejad’s^[29] administration, are partly to blame.^[30] The problems with privatisation are in turn a result of the weakness of the rule of law described above. In addition, the effects of sanctions and rampant inflation exacerbated by economic mismanagement and corruption can also be cited as factors. Indeed, the fact that inequality increased dramatically during Ahmadinejad’s first term, when oil prices reached new heights, fuelled suspicions of wide-scale corruption.^[31] Social mobility has also been stymied by growing inequality of opportunity in the area of education.^[32] Finally, another feature of the Islamic Republic undermining its rhetorical drive for social justice has been the crackdown on labour activists and trade unionists. Independent trade unions are a vital instrument in achieving social justice and reducing inequality. The repression of trade unions has been a consistent feature of the Islamic Republic since 1979 – independent trade unions are banned and labour activism has been repressed, often violently, and replaced with state-controlled Islamic worker boards. These organisations have policed dissent and directed worker grievances into more manageable forms.^[33] This was another growing trend during Ahmadinejad’s term and continues under the present administration.

In light of the above and the evidence provided by the contributions to this issue, the Islamic Republic of Iran is encouraged to: